In this Surveillance Report, I break down some genuinely uncomfortable new research: under certain conditions, password managers can be manipulated in ways that let an attacker read (and sometimes even write to) your vault. The big theme is that these attack vectors assume a very high bar—things like a full server compromise or a malicious insider—yet that’s still a reasonable threat model when we’re talking about the keys to your entire digital life. I cover how Bitwarden’s account recovery/key escrow flows and “legacy compatibility” can be abused, why item-by-item encryption can introduce malleability risks, and why the term “zero knowledge” is often more marketing than a formally defined guarantee. My takeaway isn’t “ditch your password manager.” Even a flawed password manager beats password reuse by a massive margin. What I do recommend is adjusting your settings and workflow: disable account recovery/key escrow if you don’t need it, be cautious with vault sharing/family features, keep your apps updated to avoid downgrade paths, and use a strong, unique master password. I also touch on the bigger platform picture: Google’s push toward developer verification that threatens sideloading on Android, Apple’s global age verification rollout and the danger of turning Big Tech into internet gatekeepers, and why “official app stores” still routinely ship insecure apps—like widely installed Android mental health apps with serious vulnerabilities.